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America is in the midst of the largest decline in violent
crime rates in more than half a century. According to Uniform
Crime Report (UCR) statistics, from 1991 to 1999, homicide
rates in the United States fell by 41 percent and robbery rates by
44 percent. Estimates for 1999 indicate that homicide and
robbery rates in the United States are at the lowest level since
the late 1960s.2 To put these recent declines into perspective, it
is helpful to compare them to earlier trends. UCR trends for
murder and robbery from 1946 to 1999 provide such a compari-
Professor, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, University of Mary-
land.
I See FBI, CRME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIMm RPOrS 1999, 5
(2000) [hereinafter FBI CRiME 1999]; FBI, CRIME IN THE UNrrED STATES: uNIFOl
CRIm RFPORTS 1991, 13, 26 (1992).
2 See FBI CRIME 1999, supra note 1, at 5.
son.3 The series begins in 1946 because of serious validity prob-
lems with pre-World War II UCR data.4
The low crime period, from 1946 to 1960, is marked by low
and stable crime rates; the crime boom period, from 1961 to 1973,
is marked by rapidly increasing crime rates; the crime plateau pe-
riod, from 1974 to 1990, is marked by fluctuating but consis-
tently high crime rates; and the crime bust period, from 1991 to
1999, is marked by steep declines ii crime.
The lowest reported rate of murder since World War II oc-
curred in 1957 and the lowest reported robbery rate occurred in
1956.5 But violent crime rates began to increase dramatically
during the crime boom period. From 1961 to 1974, murder
rates nearly doubled and robbery rates more than tripled. The
highest levels of murder and robbery of the postwar period were
recorded during the crime plateau period. Murder reached its
postwar peak in 1980 and robbery in 1991.7 But rates fluctuated
considerably during the plateau period. Both murder and rob-
bery experienced two crime boomlets during this period-one
during the late 1970s and the other during the mid-1980s."
These boomlets were considerably smaller and of shorter dura-
tion than the sustained increases that happened during the
crime boom period. Thus the steepest homicide boom lasted
for 12 years from 1963 to 1974 and resulted in a 53.1 percent
3See id.; FBI, GRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1946 TO 1998, 5
(1999) [hereinafter FBI CRIME 1946 TO 1998].
4Another critical year in UCR history is 1960, when the FBI mounted a compre-
hensive campaign to increase the number of police agencies reporting crime statistics
to the bureau. See GARV LAFREE, LOSING LEGIIMACY' STREET CRIME AND THE DECLINE
OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA 25 (1999).
5 See FBI CRIME 1946 TO 1998, supra note 3, at 5.
6 Seeid at5.
See id. at 7. Murder reached its second highest postwar level in 1991, the same
year as the highest postwar level for robbery.
8 1 argue elsewhere that the relative disinterest that criminology has shown in lon-
gitudinal data is demonstrated by the fact that we lack a basic shared vocabulary to
describe crime changes over time in precise language. See Gary LaFree, Declining Vio-
lent Crime Rates in the 1990s: Predicting Crime Booms and Busts, 25 ANN. REV. Soc. 145,
145-68 (1999). I use the term crime "boom" to refer to a rapid increase in crime rates
and "bust" to a rapid decline. Id. at 145-46. I further distinguish the major crime
boom of the 1960s from two smaller "boomlets" in the late 1970s and mid-1980s. See
id.
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increase in homicides.9 By contrast, the homicide boomlet from
1977 to 1980 lasted only four years and resulted in a 13.7 per-
cent increase and the boomlet of 1985 to 1991 lasted seven
years and resulted in a 19.4 percent increase." In percentage
terms, the crime boom of the 1960s was 3.9 times bigger than
the late 1970s boomlet and 2.7 times bigger than the mid-1980s
boomlet."
The crime bust period began in 1991 and had lasted eight
consecutive years when this review was being prepared.'2 This
compares with a crime boom that lasted eleven consecutive
years for murder and ten consecutive years for robbery.'3 So far
at least, the boom of the 1960s was more rapid than the bust of
the 1990s, but the differences are rapidly narrowing. Homicide
rates increased by 5.2 per 100,000 residents (from 4.6 to 9.8)
during the boom period from 1963 to 1974."4 So far, from 1991
to 1999, homicide rates have declined by 4.0 per 100,000 (from
9.8 to 5.8).'s Robbery rates increased by 129.7 per 100,000 resi-
dents from 1961 to 1971 (58.3 to 188.0) and declined by 120.7
per 100,000 residents from 1991 to 1999 (272.7 to 152.0). '6
Thus, the average decline in homicide rates per 100,000 resi-
dents has been 0.5 for the past eight years and the average de-
cline in robbery has been 15.1 per 100,000 residents. If these
averages continue in the years ahead, in the year 2000 the rob-
bery bust will surpass the robbery boom of the 1960s, and in
2001 the homicide bust will surpass the homicide boom of the
1960s.
9SeeFBI GR~iE 1946 TO 1998, supra note 3, at20 (1999).
0See id. The boomlet of the mid-1980s is even shorter if we require that every
consecutive year show increased crime rates in order to qualify. Based on this re-
quirement, the homicide boomlet lasted only five years from 1987 to 1991. See id.
1See id
12 See id. at 5.
13Robbery rates declined slightly in 1971 and then increased again until reaching
a peak in 1975. If we discount the slight decline in 1971, the robbery boom lasted 14
years.
14 See id. at 20.
15See id. at 25; FBI CRimE 1999, supra note 1, at 5 (2000).
16 See FBI CRME 1946 TO 1998, supra note 3, at 10; FBI CtmitE 1999, supra note 1, at
20001
GARY IAFREE
In The Crime Drop in America, editors Alfred Blumstein and
Joel Wallman concentrate on trying to explain the crime bust of
the 1990s." However, they also make frequent reference to the
crime boomlet of the mid-1980s, and to a lesser extent, to ear-
lier violent crime trends. 8 Blumstein is director of the National
Consortium on Violence Research and Wallman is Program Of-
ficer at the Harry Frank Guggenheim Foundation-two organiza-
tions that have funded a great deal of research on violence and
aggression in the past decade. As the first major book aimed at
explaining the 1990s crime bust, this book is a must-read for all
those interested in the characteristics and policy implications of
crime. Section I of this review summarizes the book chapter by
chapter. Then Section II considers some of the book's specific
strengths and weaknesses. Given that the crime bust of the
1960s is the only change in violent crime trends since World
War II that is as great in magnitude as the 1990s crime bust, Sec-
tion III considers some of the differences in the conceptualiza-
tion and interpretation of crime in reaction to these two pivotal
moments in the history of crime in the United States. Finally,
because this book brings together some of the most knowledge-
able contemporary experts on current crime trends, Section IV
considers this book as a benchmark for our ability to study
crime trends in the future.
I. EXPLAINING THE CRIME DROP
Blumstein and Wallman lead off the volume by placing the
recent crime drop in a broader historical context and by con-
sidering some of the likely causes of the decline. 9 For an edited
volume, the individual chapters of this book are especially well
integrated with the Introduction. This is probably a conse-
quence of how the book was produced. The editors first devised
a set of "plausible causes of the crime drop" and then recruited
individual scholars to discuss each of the causes. 20 As a result,
the Introduction is closely related to the rest of the book and is
17 THE CRIME DROP IN AMERIcA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds.,
2000) [hereinafter GRIME DROP].
18 See ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, The Recent Rise and Fall of American Vio-
lence, in CRIME DROP, supra note 17, at 1, 3.
19See id. at 1-12.
20 Id. at 2.
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an accurate and helpful summary of the issues addressed in the
individual chapters.
In the first substantive chapter of the book, Blumstein con-
centrates on disaggregating violent crime trends by type of
crime (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault), age
group, type of weapon, and city size. Blumstein stresses the
importance of disaggregating crime trends to better understand
their dynamics-a theme that is echoed by many of the contribu-
tors to the individual chapters.22 Blumstein also summarizes the
strengths and weaknesses of Uniform Crime Reort (UCR) and
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) data, the two
principal sources of crime data used throughout the book.24
Blumstein argues that trends for murder and robbery based on
these crime data sources are likely more reliable than those for
rape and aggravated assault.5 Indeed, most of the analysis and
discussion of crime data presented in the book is limited to
homicide, and to a lesser extent, robbery trends.
Although Blumstein presents some crime data going back as
far as 1965, he focuses mostly on the period after 1985. As we
have already seen, the mid-1980s mark a period when violent
crime increased rapidly for several years and then began its his-
toric decline up to the end of the century. Blumstein shows that
the entire increase in homicides during the crime boomlet of
the mid-1980s can be attributed to rising handgun use among
kids and young adults under twenty-five years old. He also
shows that these patterns were especially pronounced for young,
African American men and for big cities." What is especially
striking about Blumstein's presentation of disaggregated violent
crime trends is how dramaticallK they increase in the mid-1980s
for young men using handguns.
21 See BLUMSTEIN, Disaggregating the Violence Trends, in CRIME DROP, Supra note 17, at
1344.
22See id. at 13.
23 The survey was originally called the National Crime Survey. The name -as
changed to the NCVS in 1992.
24 See id. at 15, 19.
25Seeid. at 15.
26 See id at 24, 32.




In the last part of the chapter, Blumstein links what is cur-
rently known about disaggregated violent crime trends directly
to the rise of the crack cocaine trade in the mid-1980s.29 Al-
though he does not offer any specific empirical links between
the characteristics of violent crime, violent crime offenders, and
crack cocaine, he argues that the rapid rise in violent crime
rates in the mid-1980s is consistent with a sequence of events in
which (1) crack cocaine became available in large urban areas;
(2) these markets were especially likely to attract young, minor-
ity males; (3) to protect their markets, these young males relied
heavily on handguns; (4) these processes lead to an explosive
general increase in the use of guns for self-protection; and (5)
the above developments triggered an explosive growth in homi-
cide and robbery.0 Blumstein attributes the decline in homi-
cide rates to the same groups that contributed the most to its
increase, but points out that there is still no "single hypothesis
about the decline period."0
1
Blumstein's chapter is especially important for the book be-
cause it brings out most of the themes that are pursued in more
depth in the individual chapters that follow. The picture that
emerges from the chapter is that both the crime boomlet of the
mid-1980s and the crime bust of the 1990s are tied mostly to
handgun use among kids and young adults under twenty-five
years old who were participating in the crack cocaine market.
32
Homicide increases are also tied disproportionately to African
Americans and residents of big cities.33 With few exceptions,
this image of the dynamics of both the growth of violent crime
in the mid-1980s and its decline in the 1990s provides the
springboard from which the remaining chapters of the book are
launched.m Thus, succeeding chapters examine the impact of
guns and gun violence,- prison incarceration, 6 the rise and de-
29See id. at 38-39.
See id
31 M at 39.
32 See id
33 See id.
34Richard Rosenfeld's chapter is the primary exception. See Richard Rosenfeld,
Patterns in Adult Homicide: 1980-1995, in CRiME DROP, supra note 17, at 130-163.




cline of large, inner-city drug markets, 7 changes in policing, the
economics of crack cocaine markets, ss and the demographic
impact on homicide of changes in the supply of men, young
persons and members of racial minority groups.s
Garen Wintemute considers the role of guns in both the
rapid increase and subsequent decline of homicide in the mid-
1980s and 1990S.40 Echoing the earlier chapter by Blumstein,
Wintemute emphasizes how narrowly focused in terms of weap-
ons the offenders and victims of the violence epidemic of the
mid-1980s really were.4 ' He shows that virtually all of the in-
crease in homicide after 1985 was due to increased gun-related
homicide and that both the perpetrators and victims of these
crimes were disproportionately likely to be young, African
American men. 2 Wintemute further links the violent crime rise
to handguns, showing that the type of handguns manufactured
and used changed substantially during this period: semiauto-
matic pistols replaced revolvers as weapons of choice,"3 the cali-
ber of ammunition used by newly manufactured handguns
rapidly increased," and the handgun market was flooded with
inexpensive (and highly lethal) semiautomatics.
Having established the nature of the recent gun epidemic,
Wintemute then considers in detail the likely impact various
gun control policies had on the subsequent decline of homicide
rates.46 He examines the success of strategies that focused on
demand and use of guns, strategies that focused on curtailing
36See William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, n CRME DROP,
supra note 17, at 97-129.
37 See Bruce Johnson, et al., The Rise and Decline of Hard Drugs, Drug Markets, and
iolence in Inner-City New York, in CRmE DROP, supra note 17, at 164-206.
38 SeeJeff Grogger, An Economic Model of Recent Trends in Violence, in CBIE DROP.
supra note 17, at 266-287.
39 SeeJames Alan Fox, Denwgraphics and U.S. Homicide, in CpI E DROP, supra note
17, at 288-318.
40SeeWintemute, supra note 35, at 45.
4 1 Seeid.
42See id. at 45-47.
43See id at 53-54.
44See id. at 54-55.
45See id. at 61.
46 See id at 67-88.
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the supply of guns, and strategies that altogether banned cer-
tain types of guns. According to Wintemute, more aggressive
policing, increased criminal justice sanctions, tracing guns that
have been used in crimes, limiting the number of gun dealers,
limiting gun sales, restricting gun buyers, and banning certain
types of guns each show at least some promise in reducing vio-
lent crime rates.48 By contrast, Wintemute concludes that gun
exchange programs, child access prevention laws, and making it
easier to obtain permits to carry concealed weapons appear to
have been largely symbolic efforts with no clear impact on vio-
lent crime rates.
Wintemute provides a comprehensive review of links be-
tween homicide and the manufacture and use of guns and also
the major public policy attempts to break or lessen this connec-
tion. However, the role of guns seems clearer in the homicide
increase in the mid-1980s than in the homicide decline in the
1990s. It is true that a wide variety of gun intervention policies
have been enacted in the 1990s. But it is also true that even
with all of these interventions, firearm victimization rates in the
United States were at about the same level in the late 1990s as
they had been in the early 1980s-long before most of the gun-
related interventions began. Moreover, the fact that so many
different types of intervention were implemented at about the
same time makes it difficult if not impossible to sort out which
specific methods were most successful.
After more than a half century of relative stability, incar-
ceration rates in the United States began an unprecedented in-
crease in 1973, quadrupling by the end of the century.50
William Spelman devotes a chapter to exploring the extent to
which this rapid build-up in incarceration rates can explain the
violent crime declines of the 1990s.5' The chief difficulty of the
incarceration thesis for explaining the recent crime bust is im-
mediately apparent: while the prison boom has been relatively
steady since 1973, violent crime rates substantially increased in
the mid-1980s and only began to decline in the 1990s. Spelman
See id.
48See id. at 70-83.
49See id. at 85-87.
50 See BLumsrmN & WALLM AN, supra note 18, at 5-6.
51 See Spelman, supra note 36, at 97-125.
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reasons that unless the recent prison increases were somehow
more effective than the earlier ones, then the dramatic de-
creases in violent crime in the 1990s can not be explained by
the growth in prison population.2 However, he then goes on to
argue that there are in fact at least three reasons to believe that
prisons have become more effective in reducing crime in the
1990s.53 First, there is evidence that the elasticity of incapacita-
tion-the percentage change in the crime rate associated with a
one-percent change in the prison population-may have in-
creased in the 1990s.54 Second, prisons are generally more ef-
fective at reducing adult than juvenile crime and for most of the
past 25 years, the proportion of violent crimes committed by
adults has been increasing.- And finally, selective incapacita-
tion associated with "three strike" and repeat offender laws may
have increased the effectiveness of prisons at reducing crime."
Spelman finds the clearest support for the first two of these
possibilities, arguing that changes in the scale of imprisonment
and the incidence ofjuvenile crime have increased the elasticity
of incapacitation.57 The impact of increased selectivity of the
criminal justice system on violent-crime declines is more com-
plex. There is evidence that selective policing, prosecution, and
sentencing programs can increase prison elasticity, but many ju-
risdictions never implemented any of these programs or they
adopted versions of these programs that were ineffective.
Overall, Spelman reaches two related conclusions about the im-
pact of imprisonment on the recent violent crime rate drop.
First, even with no change in imprisonment rates, the violent
crime rate would still have dropped substantially in the 1990s.59
But second, in the absence of the prison build up, the crime
drop would have been 27 percent smaller than it actually was.0
52 See id. at 108.
53See id. at 108-09.
54See id. at 109-113.
55See id at 114-15.
56 See id at 115-19.
5 7 See id at 119.







So, without the huge investments in prison beds, the violent
crime rate would not have dropped as far or as fast as it has. But
it would have nevertheless dropped a good deal.
Richard Rosenfeld's chapter concentrates on changes in the
homicide rate for those twenty five years of age and older.6 ' He
points out that the huge interest in the rise of violent crime
rates among young people in the mid-1980s has obscured the
fact that homicide rates for persons twenty five and older had
been steadily declining since 1980.2 Moreover, these decreases
have been extremely broad gauged, affecting women as well as
men, African Americans as well as whites, and homicides com-
mitted by family members as well as those committed by strang-
ers and acquaintances. 3 But while there were declines in
violent crime rates for all homicides involving those person
twenty five and older during the 1980s and 1990s, the declines
were especially pronounced for homicides involving family
members.64 To explain the general decline in homicides among
this group, Rosenfeld concentrates on the impact of increasing
incarceration rates.65 To explain the more specific decline in
family homicides he looks instead at changes in marriage rates
and the growing availability of support services aimed at reduc-
ing domestic violence.66
Compared to Spelman's task of examining the impact of
imprisonment on both juvenile and adult crime, Rosenfeld's
emphasis has two immediate advantages. First, the connection
between imprisonment rates and crimes committed by persons
twenty five and older is more obvious because a majority of in-
mates are in the twenty five and older age category. And sec-
ond, unlike homicide trends for youth, homicide trends for
those twenty five and older do not include the steep increases in
the mid-1980s-at the same time that prison population was also
rapidly increasing. Although both Spelman and Rosenfeld ex-
plore connections between imprisonment and the decline in
violent crime in recent decades, the forecasting methods used
61 See ROSENFELD, supra note 34, at 130-63.
62 See id at 130-31.
63 See id. at 134.
64 See id. at 137, 142.
65See id at 143.
66See id at 152-56.
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by the two authors are quite different. Spelman uses what he
calls a "top down" approach that statistically relates aggregate
crime rates to aggregate imprisonment rates.G Rosenfeld in-
stead uses what Spelman calls a "bottom up" model, that starts
with an estimation of the offending rate of criminals and then
calculates how many crimes were averted by incarcerating these
offenders. 6s
The major drawback of Rosenfeld's approach is the diffi-
culty of estimating how many homicides were actually averted by
imprisonment. Rosenfeld's solution to this problem is to use
homicide rates from two large urban areas (Chicago and St.
Louis) to develop an estimate for the homicide rate of those be-
ing sentenced to prison-and hence, the number of homicides
averted by incarceration.6 Based on the assumption that
"prison inmates are drawn disproportionately from high-risk
urban communities," Rosenfeld uses police files to compute
homicide rates for the 10 percent of census tracts in each city
that had the highest crime rates. 7' Based on these techniques,
Rosenfeld concludes that incarceration reduced the murder
rate for those twenty five years of age and older by 10 percent
between 1980 and 1985, nearly 19 percent between 1985 and
1990, and over 26 percent between 1990 and 1995. 7' Thus, Ro-
senfeld's estimates of the impact of imprisonment for the older
population in earlier years are lower than Spelman's estimate
for the entire population (27 percent), but approach Spelman's
estimate for later years.2
To explain the drop in homicide among family members
for the twenty five and older group, Rosenfeld focuses on the
declining marriage rate and the rise of domestic violence pre-
vention services. Rosenfeld shows that marriage rates plum-
meted among adults in the United States at about the same time
as declines in homicide rates for those twenty five years of age
67 See SPELmAN, supra note 36, at 98, 108-09.
68See id. at 97-98; ROSENFELD, supra note 34, at 143-45.
69 See ROSENFELD, supra note 34, at 146.
70°Id
.
71 See id. at 147-49.
72 See id.; See SPEuLm, supra note 36, at 123.
73 See id. at 152-56.
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and older.7 He speculates that falling marriage rates lowered
intimate partner homicides by simply reducing the amount of
contact between married persons. Rosenfeld also briefly con-
siders the possibility that declining homicide rates among those
twenty five years of age and older may in part reflect a cultural
shift that puts greater value on solving disputes without vio-
lence.76 In support, he cites recent research evidence showing
reduced tolerance for domestic violence." More generally, he
raises the possibility that the "civilizing process" first outlined by
criminological pioneer Norbert Elias in the 1920s may have be-
latedly taken hold with American adults.78
Bruce Johnson, Andrew Golub, and Eloise Dunlap examine
connections between drugs and the spectacular increase and
equally spectacular decline of violent crime in inner-city New
York City." The focus on New York City is justified both by the
disproportionate impact of New York on violent crime rates (as
much as 10 percent of the national total for some years) and by
the fact that the crime bust has been especially well publicized
in New York. Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap's chapter is different
from the others in the book in at least two respects. First, it is
based on a single city whereas most of the other chapters in the
book emphasize national statistics.80 And second, it relies pri-
marily on qualitative field assessments, whereas most of the
other chapters in the book depend on quantitative evaluations.8 '
Still, the authors, like the other contributors, begin with the
problem of how to explain the crime bust of the 1990s and then
systematically evaluate the quality of the supporting evidence.
Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap argue that both the crime rise
of the mid-1980s and the crime drop of the 1990s can be ex-
plained by a transformation of "conduct norms" within succes-
74 See id. at 153, 156.
75 See id at 152.
76 See id. at 156.
77 See id. (citing, Murray A. Straus, Trends in Cultural Norms and Rates of Partner Vio-
lence: An Update to 1992, in UNDERSTANDING PARTNER VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE, CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND SOLrTIONS 30-33 (S.A. Stith and MA. Straus eds., 1995)).
78 Id at 157. (citing, NORTBERT ELIAS, THE CIVIUZING PROCESS (1994)).
79 SeeJOHNSON ET. AL., supra note 37, 164-206.
80 See id. at 164.
81 See id at 170.
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sive drug subcultures.8 2 They define conduct norms as "specific
rules persons internalize" and drug subcultures as "related con-
duct norms organized around a specific behavior that prescribe
what participants must do, proscribe what they must not do, and
define sanctions for noncompliance."s3 The authors claim that
since World War II, New York City has experienced three rela-
tively distinctive drug subcultures: the heroin injection era
(which peaked from 1960 to 1973), the cocaine/crack era
(which peaked from 1984 to 1989), and the marijuana/blunts"'
era (which started in 1990)."' According to the authors, the tim-
ing of violent crime trends are closely related to the relative
strength of these three drug subcultures.83 Thus, the rise of the
cocaine/crack subculture coincided with the violent crime in-
crease that began in the mid-1980s and the rise of the mari-
juana/blunts subculture occurred at the same time as the 1990s
decline in violent crime rates.87 The arguments made in the
chapter are based mostly on Johnson's extensive ethnographic
observations of the New York City drug scene over the past
three decades, drawn from prior publications.
The main birth years for the heroin generation were from
1945 to 1954.B By the time this group reached early adulthood
in the 1960s, there were many regular heroin users in New York
City.3 Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap estimate that about one-
quarter of the heroin generation supported their habits by
committing robbery.90 However, heroin users during the 1960s
rarely carried or obtained handguns and assaults and murders
by heroin users were relatively rare.9' But during the 1960s and
early 1970s, New York City, like other large urban areas in the
United States, was wracked by social unrest, factory closings, and
82Id.
83See id. at 165.
84 "Blunts" are produced by placing marijuana in the wrapper of a cheap cigar.
See id. at 167-70.
86 See id. at 196.
87 See id. at 196-97.
88 See id& at 168.
See id. at 170.
90 See id- at 173.
9 1 See i&i
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the flight of the middle class.92 According to Johnson, Golub,
and Dunlap these developments led to increasing inner-city de-
cay.93 Moreover, the level and visibility of law enforcement in994
many inner cities declined during this same period.94 As law en-
forcement retreated from the inner city, heroin sales became
increasingly public.95 By the 1990s, the original heroin genera-
tion still comprised a disproportionate number of all heroin in-
jectors, but their numbers had been greatly decreased by risky
lifestyles, especially rapid increases in AIDS-related deaths.90
The main birth years for the cocaine/crack generation were
from 1955 to 1969.9 By the time this group reached adulthood
in the 1970s, snorting cocaine had grown into a major leisure
time activity in New York City.98 Moreover, the discovery of
"freebasing" in 1980 produced a faster and more intense high.9
However, the expense of cocaine and the technical difficulty of
freebasing effectively limited its use to drug dealers and a few
wealthy customers. But this changed drastically around 1984
with the appearance of "crack" cocaine.' Crack required rela-
tively little money, technical expertise, or specialized equip-
ment.' 2 Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap argue that because of
these favorable characteristics, crack use exploded.0 3  The
emerging market was so lucrative that nearly the entire labor
force of the illicit drug market was attracted to it.'" And unlike
the members of the heroin subculture, the crack subculture
92 See id. at 174.
93See id
94See id at 173-74.
95See id 174-75.








104 See id at 178.
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quickly developed strong connections to handguns.' 05 During
the crack era, New York City experienced substantial increases
in violent crimes, including murder, robbery, assault and do-
mestic violence. 0 6 Compared to the police response to heroin,
the police response to crack was rapid and severe.'0° Thousands
of crack users and dealers were arrested, processed and sen-
tenced.'8
The marijuana/blunts generation was born in the 1970s
and has reached adulthood in the 1990s.'09 This group has to a
remarkable degree rejected both heroin and cocaine/crack."0
Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap argue that the main reason for this
transformation is that the marijuana generation has grown up
with the ample negative role models provided by family and
friends who have been heroin and cocaine users." In contrast
to the cocaine/crack subculture, the blunts' subculture is not
substantially involved in the routine commission of violent
crime and the use of guns is not an integral part of their subcul-
ture. Moreover, compared to the early years of the heroin
generation, the conduct norms of the blunts' generation are en-
forced by a much more active form of policing in New York City.
The authors argue that frequent handgun checks and "quality
of life" law enforcement have been especially successful in
eliminating handguns and in reducing the public visibility of
street-level crime.
John Eck and Edward Maguire examine the possibility that
changes in policing account for the 1990s drop in violent
crime.' The authors divide changes in policing into two broad
105See id at 180.
106 See id. at 196.
107 See id. at 183.
108See id




113 See id. at 188.
114 SeeJoHN E. ECK & EDWARD R. MAGUIRE, Have Changes in Policing Reduced Violent
Crime?An Assessment of theEvidenc in CRimE DoP, supra note 17, at 207-265.
2000]
GARY LAFREE
categories: generic and focused." 5 Major generic changes in po-
licing include increasing the number of police, community po-
licing, and zero tolerance policing."16 There is no commonly
accepted definition of community policing, but the authors
identify two aspects of community policing that qualify as ge-
neric changes: internal organizational changes and community
partnerships." 7 In general, approaches based on internal or-
ganizational changes emphasize changing the management,
structure, and culture of police organizations."8 Community
partnerships depend on various strategies for forging better re-
lationships between police and communities."'9 A third generic
approach, zero-tolerance policing, includes a variety of aggres-
sive policing strategies more commonly referred to as "quality of
life" or "broken windows" approaches."20 Despite the popularity
of many of these approaches, Eck and Maguire conclude that
there is little consistent evidence that they had anything to do
with the 1990s drop in violent crime rates. 
21
Major focused changes include directed patrols in hot spots,
firearms' enforcement, retail drug market enforcement, and
problem-oriented policing.'9 The main logic of directed patrols
is that crimes do not happen randomly but are concentrated
among repeat offenders, places, and even victims. 23 One of the
best known of the directed patrol experiments is New York City
Police Department's Compstat process. 24  Implemented in
1994, Compstat relies on directed patrol buttressed by substan-
tial data support in the form of mapping, statistical profiles, and
detailed precinct-level information. Retail drug market en-
115 See id. at 208.
116 See id
117See i4. at 218-24.
118See id. at 218.
119See id. at 221.
120Id. at 224.
121 See id- at 228.
122 See id. at 228-29.
123 See id at 229-230.
124 See id. at 229.
125 See id at 230.
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forcement includes various types of police crackdowns.'' The
main idea of problem-oriented policing is to focus police atten-
tion on problems identified by the community rather than on
those selected by police administrators.'2
In contrast to their evaluation of generic approaches, the
authors conclude that all of the focused approaches have pro-
duced at least some evidence that they can be successful at re-
ducing violent crime.'2 However, with the exception of drug
market enforcement, none of these approaches were widely im-
plemented before the 1990s drop in violent crime rates had al-
ready begun.'2 And the authors point out that even the drug
market enforcement strategy is only a plausible explanation for
recent declines in homicide if we are also willing to accept as
fact the assertion that the drop in violent crime was due mostly
to a decline in crack markets.
While there is evidence for the general conclusion that di-
rected patrols of hot spots can help reduce violent crime rates,
there is little evidence that the specific Compstat program did
this during the 1990s. '3' The authors point out that the main
problem with linking Compstat to recent declines in violent
crime in New York City is the simple fact that Compstat was im-
plemented long after major declines in homicide had already
begun and there is little evidence that it accelerated the de-
clines that were already taking place.3 2
Eck and Maguire conclude that there is evidence that fo-
cused firearm enforcement efforts can be successful, but there is
much more uncertainty about which specific types of gun en-
forcement work best and the extent to which gun enforcement
tactics were actually applied by police in the 1990s.'3 Of all the
policing changes reviewed, the authors seem most enthusiastic
about problem-oriented policing (POP), but point out that its
126 See id at 238-39.
127 See i& at 243-45.
128 See id. at 245.
12 See i&L
130See id. at 242.
131 See id. at 229, 233-34.
132 See id. at 233-34.
133 See id- at 238.
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national effects are difficult to measure because some depart-
ments have made serious efforts to implement the POP phi-
losophy while others have only superficially applied some of the
buzzwords and concepts.13 1 In the end, the authors conclude
that no changes in policing can be clearly and independently
linked to the recent declines in violent crime. Generic meth-
ods probably had no influence on the national drop in violent
crime rates; focused methods may have played a role in the de-
clines, but only in conjunction with other criminal justice poli-
cies and broader social changes that had nothing to do with
policing.'3 6
Jeff Grogger begins his chapter with the assumption that the
increase in violent crime rates in the mid-1980s and its decline
in the 1990s are both tied directly to the sudden appearance
and growing maturity of crack cocaine markets. 137 The Grogger
chapter is an economic model of why the crack market went
through the changes that it did and how these changes were in
turn related to violent crime trends. The author uses the same
model to help explain why criminal violence in the mid-1980s
peaked earlier in larger than in smaller cities, and why criminal
violence during this period was so concentrated among eco-
nomically disadvantaged youth.'s
The foundation of Grogger's model is the standard eco-
nomic assumption that "individual agents seek to maximize
their utility."'' To make his model easier to evaluate, Grogger
ignores the impact that risk has on individual evaluations, con-
centrating instead on labor market mechanisms.'40 Grogger
predicts that individuals will work if wages are high enou h but
will commit crime if the returns to crime exceed wages. "' To
test this prediction he uses the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NYSL) to show that among a sample of young men em-
134See id at 245.
135 See id. at 248-49.
136 See id. at 245.
137 See GROGGER, supra note 38, at 266-87.
138 See id. at 268-73.





ployed in 1979, those who admitted committing a property
crime had wages that were 15 percent lower than those who did
not admit to a property crime.4 2 A similar analysis shows that
compared to those who did not report having committed a re-
cent crime, those who reported committing a recent crime had
worked fewer hours annually.4 3 Grogger shows that the wage
gap between black and white men in the NYSL sample can ac-
count for about one-fourth of the race difference in crime par-
ticipation rates and the fact that young workers earn less than
older workers can entirely account for why property crime is
concentrated among young persons within the sample."4
Grogger's strategy for developing an economic model to
predict violent crime trends after the mid-1980s is to first de-
velop a model to explain property crime."" Based on evidence
that much of the increase in homicides in the 1980s was driven
by gun homicides and was stranger related,"" he argues that a
simple labor market model can usefully be extended to explain
the rapid increase in instrumental violent crimes that occurred
in the 1980s. 47 Grogger reasons that only two changes in the
model he is proposing could have generated the increase in vio-
lence in the mid-1980s: declining wages or increasing criminal
productivity.48 Indeed, real wages were falling in the mid-1980s,
but because they had been falling steadily since the mid-1970s,
Grogger concludes that they do not match well the abrupt
change in violent crime. " He concludes that there is much bet-
ter evidence for an increase in criminal productivity during this
period. 150 Grogger argues that the advent of crack cocaine can
be interpreted as a "technology shock" that increased criminal
142See id at 270-71.
See id.
144See i. at 271.
145See id. at 273.
146 See e.g., PHILIPJ. COOK ANDJOHN H. LAUB, The Unprecedented Epidemic m Youth
Vwlence, in CUME ANDJUS'nCE: A REVMV OF RESEARCH 27-64 (Michael Tonry and M.H.
Moore eds., 1998) (describing the increase in stranger-related gun homicides during
the 1980s).
147See GROGc;ER, supra note 38, at 273.





productivity by abruptly lowering the price of cocaine intoxica-
tion. 5' With the emergence of crack, "a given amount of time
devoted to crime yields greater income than before."' 5' Rising
profits as a result of the technology shock increase the numbers
of individuals entering the market to take advantage of ex-
panded opportunities. 53 But the expansion of the market also
increases competition and necessitates growing violence as en-
trepreneurs fight to preserve or increase their profits. 4
Grogger uses similar logic to explain the sudden decline of
crime in the 1990s. 55 He argues that as the crack market ex-
panded, so too did the amount and lethality of violence.' 56 But
as the demand for more and better weapons rose among drug
sellers, it also drove up the cost of entering drug markets. 7 Not
only did the crack market demand investment in ever greater
quantities of expensive armaments, but it also entailed much
greater risk of injury or death.'58 As the cost of entering the
market increased, the market contracted and violence rates de-
clined. 59 Grogger argues that similar processes may have af-
fected the costs of consuming crack for buyers because
increasing violence surrounding crack markets also imposes
growing risks for buyers. 60
Grogger claims that his model proposes an economic alter-
native to the cultural argument made by Bruce Johnson and his
colleagues. 161 While Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap argue that the
blunts generation turned away from cocaine and heroin be-
cause of the negative examples set by older users, Grogger
counters that their rejection of crack was mostly a rational re-
sponse to the rising costs imposed by violence in the illegal
151 Id. at 275-76.
152 Id. at 276.
153 See id
154See id
155 See id at 277.
156 See id at 277-78.
157 See id
158 See id at 278.
159 See id
160 Seeid
161 See id at 280.
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crack market.'62 But on closer inspection, it isn't entirely clear
that the two explanations are all that different. While Johnson,
Golub, and Dunlap do not invoke the utility principle to explain
the behavior of the blunts generation, they do portray the reac-
tion of the blunts subculture to crack as a rational response to
the costs that crack use had exacted on their relatives and older
acquaintances.' s The main difference in the two conclusions is
that the decisions of Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap's blunts gen-
eration are buttressed by subcultural norms while Grogger's
"individual agents" are responding only to market forces.
In the final chapter of the volume, James Alan Fox consid-
ers the possibility that the recent declines in violent crime in the
United States have been produced by changing demographic
characteristics, especially age.'r" Using demographic character-
istics to make predictions about crime has a long history and
can be traced back to the work of French mathematician and as-
tronomer Lambert-Adolphe-Jacques Quetelet, in the first half of
the nineteenth century.'6' The rationale behind the approach is
at once straightforward and compelling. We know that violent
crime in America has been disproportionately committed by
young adult males. All else equal, violent crime rates should
therefore increase as the percentage of persons in this demo-
graphic category increases. Demographic variables have the
added advantage of being relatively easy to measure. If we know
how many individuals are in a particular demographic category
at a specific point in time, it is not difficult to project estimates
of the size of this group forward in time.
Fox presents data that underscores the growing contribu-
tions of young men-especially African-Americans-to the mid-
1980s crime increase.' 6 He shows that the mean age of both
homicide offenders and victims has dropped by about four years
from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s.'6 According to Fox, this
"juvenilization" of murder has changed the overall nature of
162See id.;JOHNSON ET. AL., supra note 37, at 185.
163 SeeJoHN sON E. AL., supra note 37, at 185.
164 See Fox, supra note 39, at 288-317.
165See id. at 289.
166See id. at 298.
167 See id- at 304.
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homicide in America.'6 To begin with, rising homicide rates
among juveniles and young adults in the mid-1980s were ac-
companied by substantial increases in the percentage of homi-
cides committed with guns.' 6' Due to changes in the behavior of
offenders age fourteen to twenty four, the percentage of all
homicides using a firearm rose from less than 60 percent in the
mid-1980s to nearly 70 percent by 1990.70 As younger offenders
committed an increasing proportion of total homicides, the
percentage of homicides committed by more than one offender
and the proportion of homicides that targeted strangers also in-
creased.
Although the age distribution was frequently invoked to ex-
plain the crime boom of the 1960s, 72 it was not very useful in
explaining the rise in crime in the mid-1980s. This is because
the proportion of individuals in the crime prone years of eight-
een to twenty four were generally declining at the same time
that violent crime rates were increasing. However, demo-
graphic characteristics are a more promising explanation for
the crime bust of the 1990s.' Using 1991 age-race-sex specific
rates of offending as a baseline, Fox predicts the proportion of
the homicide offense rate that can be attributed solely to demo-
graphic changes.'7 5 According to Fox, the contribution of
demographics to the crime decline was greatest in 1993 and
1994, when it accounted for about 16 percent of the total
drop. 7 6 By 1997 and 1998, the role of demographics in explain-
ing homicide declines had dropped to about ten percent.'
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did play a role in the 1990s crime rate decline, albeit a modest
one."
178
II. THE ORIGINALITY AND SCOPE OF THE BOOK
One of the common limitations of edited books is that the
academic system that produces them generally puts greater
value on refereed publications than book chapters. As a conse-
quence, individual contributors to edited volumes often save
their strongest, most original work for journals or monographs
and write book chapters that to varying degrees are based on
work that they have already published, or work that has less
methodological sophistication than is demanded by journals.
Although the articles included in this book were all written spe-
cifically for the volume, many of the conclusions and results
have already appeared elsewhere. Certainly most of the ideas in
Blumstein's chapter on disaggregating crime trends, Johnson
Golub, and Dunlap's chapter on the rise and decline of hard
drugs, and Fox's chapter on demography and crime will be fa-
miliar to readers. Likewise, chapters by the other contributors
build substantially on their already published work.
Moreover, given the considerable methodological sophisti-
cation of the contributors, there is little in the way of path-
breaking new research methods in this book. This may be due
partly to the task the contributors were given: to determine
whether a particular type of policy or variable could explain the
crime drop of the 1990s. When viewed in this way, the contribu-
tors were faced with a sample of only eight-the number of years
in the current crime decline. In fact, given this restriction,
some of the techniques the contributors developed for linking
various factors to the crime drop were creative. Still, other ways
of analyzing the crime drop that would have been more interest-
ing and labor intensive-such as studying a sample of cities or
counties over time, or doing time-series analyses over much
longer periods-were not attempted.
But while much of the book draws heavily on already pub-
lished work, the authors do update, reorganize and extend their
earlier work in these chapters. Moreover, by pulling out the
specific implications of their earlier work for the recent crime




policy issue. And of course it is an advantage to have the diverse
information contained in the book available in one place.
Several of my criticisms of the book have to do in one way
or another with its scope. Criticizing a book for what it leaves
out seems to always be more questionable than criticizing it for
what it puts in for the obvious reason that all books have to de-
limit their boundaries somewhere. However, the scope of this
book seriously limits its usefulness in several ways.
Perhaps most importantly, with few exceptions (mostly
Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap's study of drug subcultures in New
York City) most of the analysis and discussion in the book is lim-
ited to crime trends after 1985. While this is certainly under-
standable in a book whose main task is to explain the crime
drop of the 1990s, it has important theoretical and methodo-
logical implications. Because the book focuses mostly on very
recent comparisons, it never explicitly considers the issue of
what the best historical context is for analyzing the crime drop
of the 1990s. The implication of this strategy can be seen by re-
turning to the UCR trends from 1946 to 1998 that were dis-
cussed at the beginning of this review. If we focus just on
violent crime trends from 1985 to 1999, we see a rather sharp
crime increase, peaking in 1991, followed by a rapid decline.
Indeed, most of the chapters in the book make the implicit as-
sumption that the crime drop of the 1990s is mostly a response
to the crime increase of the mid-1980s. And since a major ar-
gument in the book is that the crime increase in the mid-1980s
was produced mostly by the deadly nexus of crack, guns, and
youth violence, it becomes natural to think of the correspond-
ing 1990s drop in violent crime in the same terms.
But as we have seen above, the crime increase of the mid-
1980s was not nearly as long or as large as the crime increase of
the 1960s and early 1970s. What if the decline in crime in the
1990s is not a response to the crime boomlet of the mid-1980s,
but is rather a response to the major crime boom that began
three decades earlier? Eck and Maguire actually raise this pos-
sibility in their chapter, pointing out the utility of comparing
policing during the crime boom of the 1960s and the crime bust
of the 1990s to determine whether changes in police behavior
are implicated in the earlier crime rise in the same way that they
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are implicated in the later crime drop.' Unfortunately, the
authors do not build this comparison into their analysis and re-
view.
By looking mostly at the boomlet of the mid-1980s and the
bust of the 1990s, the book's contributors effectively limit their
discussion to the crack cocaine-youth-racial minority explana-
tion for the crime bust. This has immediate implications in
terms of the choice of topics investigated. With few exceptions
(e.g., Rosenfeld's discussion of marriage rates and the increas-
ing availability of support services for spouse abuse victims), the
major causes of crime examined in the book are the same ones
that have been heavily implicated in the crime boomlet of the
mid-1980sY'8 Moreover, the book largely excludes other types of
explanations that might be more logical if we consider the de-
cline of crime in the 1990s as a response not to the boomlet of
the mid-1980s, but to the boom of the 1960s. For example,
Grogger calls his chapter "an economic model" of violent crime,
but in fact the chapter focuses entirely on developing an eco-
nomic interpretation of violent crime trends in response to the
rise and decline of crack cocaine markets after the mid-1980s.Y8
Other potentially important economic variables-income ine-
quality, unemployment, poverty, inflation, welfare spending,
and educational opportunity-are never considered. Likewise,
while Blumstein and Wallman note that the crime boom of the
1960s and early 1970s "may have been, at least in part, a result
of the decline in perceived legitimacy of American social and
governmental authority during this turbulent period," the vol-
ume includes no analysis of the impact of such measures as po-
litical legitimacy, trust or social capital on the crime drop of the
1990s.1
82
The scope of the book is also limited by the fact that the in-
dividual chapters are each focused for the most part on a single
potential cause of crime. This means that there is little discus-
sion of the relative importance of the different causal factors in-
vestigated. This limitation flows directly from the fact that the
book was produced by asking seven researchers or groups of re-
1-9See EcKAND MAGUIRE, supra note 114, at 250.
180SeeRosENEELD, supra note 34, at 152.
See GRoGGER, supra note 38, at 266-67.
182BLU mS-EIN & WALLMAN, supra note 18, at 4.
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searchers to each consider the impact on the crime drop of an
area in which they had special expertise. But once these indi-
vidual, largely uncoordinated assessments were assembled, they
were naturally difficult to compare. As the editors point out,
the great range of methods used in the individual chapters-
from ethnographic to econometric-make direct comparisons
unwise. 3
The editors argue that because each of the individual ex-
planations in the book is tenable, and none inherently excludes
any of the others, that the causes for the recent decline in crime
are due to "a variety of factors, some independent and some in-
teracting in a mutually supportive way."' But of course this is
an untested hypothesis. Because the book presents no models
that simultaneously evaluate rival explanations, it can offer no
definitive word on which potential explanations are most im-
portant or how different explanations interact with, amplify, or
cancel out each other. Given that this book is clearly aimed at
influencing public policy, this is a potentially big drawback. For
example, it means that if we are interested in further reductions
in crime, or concerned about new increases, the book cannot
tell us which of the factors or combinations of factors reviewed
here would be most efficacious.
Although the title of the book implies an analysis of crime
in general, most of the actual analysis in the book is limited to
homicide trends.'" Given that the two editors of this volume
both represent organizations with a specific interest in under-
standing violence and aggression, it is unsurprising that the
chapters are almost entirely limited to a concern with violent
crime trends. Moreover, an emphasis on homicide is justified
by the fact that it is likely the most frequently detected and
hence, best measured of the violent crimes. On the other hand,
the violent crimes of rape, robbery and aggravated assault are
far more common and also of considerable policy interest.
Apart from a few pages in the introductory chapter by Blum-
stein, these other violent crimes are largely ignored.1
6
18 See id. at 2.
18 4 I d -
185 Although there is also some limited analysis of robbery trends in the book.
186 See BLUMSTEIN, supra note 21, at 14-15.
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Limiting the focus of the book to homicide also limits our
understanding of the forces that produced the important
changes in crime during this period. For example, knowing
how widespread the crime decline in the 1990s has been would
give us some insight into the nature of the processes that led to
the decline. Thus, if all types of crime declined at about the
same time and at about the same rate, it might suggest that vari-
ables that are causing the change are very general, affecting
broadly different types of behavior. On the other hand, if
homicide declines are relatively unique, it might suggest that
variables causing the change are more closely related to specific
forms of crime.
III. COMPARING THE TWO LARGEST CHANGES IN VIOLENT CRIME
RATES IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD
Thinking back again to the violent crime trends shown in
the 1946-1998 UCR data, we could make the argument that the
two biggest events in the history of violent crime in America
since World War H are first, the crime boom of the 1960s and
early 1970s, and second, the crime bust of the 1990s. Given the
strategic importance of these two events, I thought it useful to
compare the policy response suggested in this book about the
crime bust to the policy response that was common during the
crime boom of the 1960s. In doing this comparison, I was espe-
cially struck by four differences in the response to the crime
boom and the crime bust.
First, confidence in official statistics has increased dramati-
cally between the crime boom of the 1960s and the crime bust
of the 1990s. During the late 1960s and early 1970s there was.
tremendous doubt among researchers and policy experts about
the fundamental reliability and validity of the UCR and other
official crime statistics. Many criminologists at the time con-
cluded that the UCR was so hopelessly biased as to have little
utility in the study of crime.'" While the President's Commis-
sion on Crime Report was somewhat less critical of the UCR, it
nevertheless expressed grave concerns about potential bias in
187 See e.g., RICHARD QUINNEY, THE SOCIAL REAL=? OF CRME (1970); G.zERT GElS,
Statistics Concerning Race and Crime, in RACE, CRME ANDJUSTICE 61-69 (G.E Reasons &
J.L. Kuykendall, eds., 1972).
20001 295
GARY LAFREE
the UCR based on race and class." Fundamental concerns with
the validity and reliability of the UCR were a critical part of the
process that resulted in the creation of the National Crime Vic-
timization Survey (NCVS) in the 1970s. 8 9 The growing availabil-
ity of NCVS data, and to a lesser extent self-reported crime
data,'9° has revolutionized attitudes toward official crime data by
convincing researchers that the quality of UCR data-at least
for murder and robbery-are reasonably good. Thus, while
concerns about the quality of crime data were paramount in the
1967 commission report, they are hardly mentioned in the
Blumstein/Wallman volume.
Second, the belief in the ability of social policy to actually
reduce crime is much stronger in the Blumstein/Wallman vol-
ume than it was in reports about the crime boom of the 1960s.
As the labeling and conflict theoretical traditions gathered
momentum in the 1960s and early 1970s, many criminologists
concluded that not only were current policies on crime failing,
but they were actually making crime-related problems worse.
Labeling perspectives suggested that serious crime was pro-
duced by societal reactions. Thus, the process of identifying, la-
beling, and stigmatizing offenders only leads to higher crime
rates. This reasoning clearly affected the 1967 President's
Commission report, which recommended a series of reforms
that severely limited the power and the jurisdiction of courts
over youthful offenders. 9  Perhaps the classic example of the
lack of confidence in the ability of public policy to affect crime
rates is the "Martinson re ort," first published at the height of
the crime boom in 19743 Martinson's conclusion that "noth-
188 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION REPORT).
189 Richard F. Sparks, Surveys of Victimization: An Optimistic Assessment, in CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH (Michael Tonry and N. Morris, eds., 1981)
190 SEE MICHAEL HINDELANG ET. AL., MEASURING DELINQUENCY 1981.
191 EDWIN M. SCHUR, RADICAL NONINTERVENInON: RETHINKING THE DELINQUENCY
PROBLEM (1973); EDWIN M. LEMERT, The Juvenile Court-Questions and Realities, in THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT:JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 91-106 (1967).
192 See LEMERT, supra note 191, at 105-06.
193Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform,
35 THE PUB. INT. 22-54 (1974).
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ing works" with regard to rehabilitation programs was of course
not universally accepted, M but nevertheless spoke to the beliefs
and probably the fears of many criminologists and policy mak-
ers at the time.
The contrast with this volume could hardly be greater.
Grogger concludes his chapter on economic models of violent
crime by claiming that, "the rise in violent crime is fairly
straightforward to explain." ' Such a confident statement
would have been inconceivable during the crime boom of the
1960s. While most of the other authors in the Blum-
stein/Wallman volume are less optimistic than Grogger, each
chapter in the book ultimately concludes that the specific vari-
able or variables being considered has at least contributed to
the crime bust. About the only indication in the Blum-
stein/Wallman book that some recent policies on crime may ac-
tually be making crime problems worse is a couple of
paragraphs in Rosenfeld's chapter in which he points out that
massive increases in incarceration may ultimately contribute to
rising crime rates by depleting marriage markets, destabilizing
families, and increasing street-gang activity."
It seems likely that part of the confidence of this group of
researchers in the conclusion that they actually know what has
produced the crime bust can be linked to the rather remarkable
connections that have been made between crack cocaine and
the crime rise of the mid-1980s.
Blumstein is in fact a key player in this development 97 The
ability of Blumstein and others to demonstrate close and con-
vincing connections between the beginning of crack cocaine
use in the mid-1980s and the rise in juvenile violent crime dur-
ing the same period has probably increased confidence among
researchers that similar conclusions can be reached for other
changes in crime trends. Indeed, it is hard to think of another
case in criminology history in which some outcome has been so
directly linked to a specific change in criminal behavior.
194 See e.g., Ted Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12J of Res. in Crime and Definq. 133-52
(1975) (refuting the idea that rehabilitation programs were all ineffective).
19 GROGGER, supra note 38, at 286.
16 See Rosenfeld, supra note 34, at 151.
197 Alfred Blumstein, Youth, Vioknpe Guns and the Illirit-DrugIndustry, 86J. CRIiM . L
& CRiINOLOGy 1, 10-36 (1995).
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More generally, it is tempting to guess that much of our out-
look about the efficacy of public policy initiatives in criminology
has been subtly shaped by the broader direction of crime trends
in different periods. For example, it must have been truly diffi-
cult for researchers to be optimistic about policy alternatives in
the early 1970s after eleven straight years of large crime in-
creases. Alternatively, it may be easier to be optimistic about the
efficacy of social policies in a period in which crime rates have
been steadily declining for several years. And it is relatively easy
to see how these processes could work. Given that most policy
efforts to reduce crime remain in operation for relatively short
periods of time, a continuously falling crime rate is bound to
make intervention efforts seem more successful, regardless of
the effect they are actually having. And of course, the reverse is
probably true for a period when crime is booming.
Third, the emphasis on trends and longitudinal data is
much more pronounced in the Blumstein/Wallman volume
than in accounts of the crime boom from the 1960s and early
1970s. Part of this change may be due to changing attitudes to-
ward official crime statistics. Because researchers and policy
experts were more wary of official statistics in the 1960s than
they are today, it no doubt made them more reticent to use offi-
cial statistics to illustrate trends. Moreover, data from the NCVS
were simply unavailable until 1973, long after the beginning of
the last major crime boom. By contrast, this book is peppered
with charts showing trends in crime and the major explanatory
variables over time. Moreover, the contributors are clearly con-
cerned about changes over time and incorporate discussion of
longitudinal trends in most of their analyses. One indication of
the importance of time in the book is the fact that many of the
authors refer to publications and reports that were published in
the same year as the book. The authors have taken special care
to include the most up-to-the minute statistics that are feasible
in the current publishing era.
Finally, compared to the 1960s crime boom, this book about
the 1990s crime bust implies a fundamentally different orienta-
tion to the way that social policy on crime should be con-
structed. Criminology has long had a kind of uneasy
relationship between its sociological roots in abstract theory and
the ongoing demands of citizens and criminal justice practitio-
ners to produce public policy that can actually be implemented.
These two traditions are sharply contrasted if we compare the
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recommendations and assumptions of the 1967 President's
Commission Report to those being made in the Blum-
stein/Wallman volume. Most of the crime policy recommenda-
tions given in the commission report are relatively abstract and
theoretical and do not lend themselves in any straightforward
way, to immediate implementation:
The Commission doubts that even a vastly improved criminal justice sys-
tern can substantially reduce crime if society fails to make it possible for
each of its citizens to feel a personal stake in it-in the good life that it
can provide and in the law and order that are prerequisite to such a
good life.'"
In order for everyone to make it possible for citizens to "feel
a personal stake" in society, the commission goes on to recom-
mend that policies be enacted to provide a minimum family in-
come for all Americans, to reduce unemployment, to
strengthen families, to eliminate job discrimination and barriers
to employment, to get people more involved in their communi-
ties, to raise the educational aspirations of lower-class children,
and to assist slum children in overcoming their inadequate
preparation for school.'9 In a review of the commission reports'
implications for juvenile justice, Lamar Empey characterizes its
policy recommendations as "heroic."20 At the very least, these
are recommendations that do not lend themselves, in any
straightforward way, to immediate implementation.
By contrast, most of the variables examined in the Blum-
stein/Wallman book are more easily measured, more amenable
to direct policy intervention, and more conceptually concrete.
In a recent review of situational crime prevention, Marcus Fel-
son describes "real-life crime prevention experiments" as those
that "do not worry about academic theories" and "focus on very
specific slices of crime."20 ' The Blumstein/Wallman book gen-
erally conforms to these two principles. Criminological theory
is relatively unimportant in this book. In the few places in
which theories are discussed in any detail (mainly, Rosenfeld
198 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 188, at 58 (1967).
199 See id. at 66, 69, 74,77.
2 00 LAMART. EMiPEY, AMNERCAN DELINQUENCY ITs MENNG AND CONsrRucrIoN 395-
96 (1982).
201MARCUS FELSON, CRiE AND EVERYDAYLIFE 117 (1994).
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and Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap), they are generally added ex
post facto, after the data analysis has already been concluded.2
The one theory that plays any major role in the book is the eco-
nomic assumption that individuals will seek to maximize their
utility. However, this assumption is so basic, that many of the
authors assume it without even explicitly stating it as a theoreti-.... 203
cal assumption (the main exception is Grogger) .
The book's emphasis on the importance of disaggregating
crime trends is also in keeping with the principle that it is nec-
essary to focus on "very specific slices of crime." The virtues of
disaggregating crime trends are raised in Blumstein's introduc-
tory chapter and appear in many of the chapters that follow.
2 05
It was through disaggregating crime data that Blumstein dem-
onstrated the connections between homicide, youth, guns, and
drugs in his influential earlier work2 and it is natural that these
methods would be carried forward to explain the crime drop of
the 1990s. The contributors to the volume separate violent
crime from property crime; murder from robbery, rape, and as-
sault; and they divide homicide into separate trends based on
age, race, gender, type of weapon, type of handgun, caliber of
handgun, city size, and relationship between the victim and the
offender. These authors are attempting to understand violent
crime trends by looking at very specific slices of crime.
As we look back to the 1960s from the vantage point of sev-
eral years of large declines in annual crime rates, it is hard not
to be impressed by the direct, empirically driven, disaggregated
approach that characterizes this book. Nevertheless, this type of
approach to social policy on crime does have some drawbacks
when compared to approaches that depend less on disaggrega-
tion. If we consider the level of disaggregation of crime trends
on a continuum that runs from more to less disaggregated, it
may be easier to see the general strengths and weaknesses of
disaggregation as a method. The great advantage of disaggrega-
tion is that it makes it easier for us to see direct connections be-
tween crime and variables that are very close to crime; call these
202See ROSENFELD, supra note 34, at 157-59;JOHNSON ET. AL., supra note 37, at 165.
203 See GROGGER, supra note 38, at 268.
204FELSON, supra note 201, at 117.
205See BLUMSTMN, supra note 21, at 13-15.
206 See Blumstein, supra note 197, at 10-36.
300 [Vol. 91
BOOK REVIEW
proximal causes. Thus, by disaggregating homicide rates re-
searchers have found that most of the increase in the mid-1980s
were handgun related, and took place among young males, dis-
proportionately African American, living in big cities.!'7 Given
the timing of these characteristics, it was logical to conclude
that the rise of crack cocaine markets were a proximal cause of
the mid-1980s homicide increases.
By contrast, less disaggregated analyses are better suited for
uncovering variables that are linked to crime at a greater dis-
tance; call these distal causes. For example, let's suppose that
violent crime is best explained by the fact that offenders are
disproportionately likely to live in neighborhoods with concen-
trated social and economic disadvantages. These kinds of
variables are likely to be connected to actual crime rates at a
greater distance through their effects on more proximate vari-
ables like drug and handgun use.
The great advantage of uncovering distal, as opposed to
proximal causes of crime is that they provide more direct con-
nections to crime that are often more amenable to public policy
intervention. Thus, knowing that crack cocaine was heavily im-
plicated in the homicide increases of the mid-1980s offers direct
and useful information about the kinds of policies likely to
lower homicide rates. But note that this explanation tells us lit-
tle about why it was that young, inner-city African American
men were disproportionately likely to actually participate in
crack cocaine markets in the first place. In fact, the question
may not even arise from a proximal perspective because in or-
der to determine why one group is more likely to commit crime
than another group, we need to use a nondisaggregated ap-
proach that combines both groups in the analysis. In other
words, disaggregating crime trends makes it easier to observe
differences between the components of the disaggregation, but
more difficult to analyze the sources of these differences.
Of course one reaction to these observations about the
weaknesses of disaggregation might simply be to say "so what?"
If we can figure out the variables that are most proximal to
crime and manipulate these variables through policy interven-
207See BLU M SIN, supra note 21, at 39.
W8 See, e.g., Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a Theory of Race,




don, we can reduce the pain and suffering associated with
crime. This is an important consideration and explains in large
part why the Blumstein/Wallman book has so much more im-
mediate relevance for public policy intervention than the Presi-
dent's Commission report. But at the same time, an emphasis
on proximal causes makes it easy to downplay distal causes, or
forget them altogether. Thus, the emphasis in this volume on
getting as close to the proximal causes of specific forms of vio-
lent crimes as possible, leads to the near total exclusion of
analysis on more distal causes of violent crime such as concen-
trated poverty, income inequality, and political legitimacy.
IV. THE LIMITEs OF POLICY IN CRIMINOLOGY
One of the less obvious benefits of the initial creation of the
National Crime Victimization Survey in the early 1970s is that by
providing a group of experts with great financial resources and
asking them to design an ideal survey from the ground up also
offered unique insights into the methodological problems in
survey methods that even having lots of expertise and a large
sum of money will not solve. For example, the NCVS has not
been very effective at measuring extremely sensitive crimes like
rape, or crimes whose detection is directly connected to the sur-
vey methodology itself, like spouse abuse. It is worth briefly
considering the Blumstein/Wallman volume as a similar kind of
benchmark: What problems does public policy on crime face
even in those relatively rare instances in which it can draw upon
a very talented group of experts who have a good deal of expe-
rience in a particular area of concern? When considered from
this viewpoint, the book may perhaps provide insights into the
limits of our current ability to provide public policy recommen-
dations with regard to changes in crime trends.
Taken as a whole, the book offers six main explanations for
the 1990s drop in violent crime:
1. More effective gun policies.
2. Increasing levels of incarceration.
3. Growing availability of services for abused women.2 O9
209 In addition to the prediction about social services, Rosenfeld also considers
the possibility that declining violent crime rates are due to declining marriage rates
and to a more general civilizing process. Declining marriage rates can be seen as
similar to demographic changes and while Rosenfeld briefly mentions the possibility
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4. Decline of crack cocaine markets
5. More effective policing, and
6. Decline in percentage of residents in crime-prone age-
gender-race categories.
The authors argue that each of these factors has had an im-
pact on reducing violent crime in the 1990s. 210  Presumably,
these six factors would also bear some relationship to violent
crime trends in the future.
Perhaps the most important limitation of the book in terms
of public policy is that we do not know what additional variables
had a significant impact on the crime bust of the 1990s and
might, therefore, be expected to affect crime trends in the fu-
ture. This limitation follows in part from the distinction be-
tween proximal and distal causes already discussed. Because
this book concentrates on proximal causes, it does not consider
in any detail the ways in which the crime bust is related to more
distal social, economic and political variables. For example,
none of the authors deal directly with the impact of the current
record-breaking economic boom on crime trends-except in the
very limited sense of connections between the economy and the
rise and fall of crack cocaine markets.
21 1
The book also does not explain how the six factors are re-
lated to each other. Are some factors more important than
others are? Are there important interactions between them?
These unanswered questions are especially relevant in terms of
the rise of crack markets. Several chapters of the book (particu-
larlyJohnson, Golub, and Dunlap's, and Grogger's) treat crack
cocaine as the key factor in both the crime increase of the mid-
1980s and the crime drop of the 1990s. 21 2 Perhaps gun policies,
incarceration rates, and the other factors would have had totally
different effects on crime in the absence of a crack epidemic.
The book would have been more effective for public policy if it
could have included a section that systematically compared the
strengths and weaknesses of each of the six factors thought to
be responsible for the crime bust. Providing this kind of con-
of a civilizing process, he offers no specific analysis of its potential effects. See
ROsENFELD, supra note 34, at 156-59.
210 SeeBLUMST Er & WALtAN, supra note 18, at 1-12.
211 See GROGGER, supra note 38, at 266-87.
212 See id.JOHNSON ET. AL., supra note 37, at 164-206.
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ceptually uniform organization was used effectively in a recent
evaluation of 500 crime prevention programs by Lawrence
Sherman and other scholars.2 '3 But a similar strategy is not pos-
sible here because each of the individual authors worked inde-
pendently, used a diverse range of research designs and
methods, and defined the purpose of their analyses in unique
ways.
Bracketing out for a moment the issue of how comprehen-
sive these six factors are and how they might interact, would it
be possible to manipulate any of these factors to regulate crime
through public policy in the future? In theory at least it is pos-
sible to manipulate all of these factors except crack cocaine
markets and the proportion of individuals in high crime demo-
graphic categories. And while we cannot easily manipulate
demographic categories, we can at least predict them reasonably
well-at least in the short term and barring any huge changes in
immigration or mortality. Of the six factors, then, the one that
is most difficult to manipulate or predict is the rise and fall of
crack cocaine markets. And this is an especially big drawback,
given that crack cocaine is the factor this is most closely related
to all of the other factors. About the best that we could do here
is predict that the sudden appearance of another drug like
crack cocaine (i.e., inexpensive, easy to manufacture, and ex-
tremely addictive) may be associated with the rapid rise of
highly violent drug markets in the future.
Perhaps the biggest single contribution of this book is in
providing a specific kind of policy-oriented mind set about
crime. Because the book is explicitly aimed at a specific policy
question, it encourages us to think about the real possibility of
doing with crime trends what economists have been doing for
many years with economic trends. The book makes it easier to
imagine developing a system whereby researchers would closely
monitor crime trends, respond with appropriate public policy
recommendations, and thereby endeavor to respond quickly to
crime booms and more generally, keep crime rates as low as
possible.
Of course, predicting crime trends, like predicting eco-
nomic trends is going to be easiest when trends are either un-
213 Lawrence W. Sherman, et. al., Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't What's
Promising, in RESEARCH IN BRIEF (1998).
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changing or changing at regular intervals. The crime booms
and busts that have characterized the United States since World
War II are difficult to predict.2 4 Still, in principle at least, crime
booms and busts are no harder to predict than economic
booms and busts. Thus, the great changes in economic trends
unleashed by the oil embargo of 1973 raised major methodo-
logical difficulties for economists2 5 just as the crime boom of
the 1960s posed methodological challenges for criminologists.
Moreover, it may never be possible to predict with any precision
the impact on crime of unique historical developments like the
civil rights movement or Vietnam War protests, or technological
innovations such as the one that resulted in crack cocaine.
About the best that we can do in cases like these is develop gen-
eralizations that we hope will cover new developments in the fu-
ture. Also, by providing forecasts that are timely, it might at
least be possible to develop a response to rising crime rates that
would be rapid enough to contain damages more effectively.
Clearly, prediction is the most precarious of social science tasks,
yet books like this begin to at least show us more clearly what
the true difficulties are.
214 We consider how exceptional post-World War II crime rates in the United
States have been in a recent comparison of trends in the United States and 34 other
countries. See Gary LaFree & Kriss Drass, Are National Crime Trends Converging?
Evidence for Homicide Victimization Rates, 1956 to 1994 (2000) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
215 See Pierre Perron, The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis,
57 ECONOMETRICA 1361-1401.
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